6.Metaphysical; as that, a.The qualities which we perceive by our senses must have a subject, which we all body; and that the thoughts we are conscious of must have a subject, which we call mind.
b.Whatever begins to exist must have a cause which produced it.
c.Design and intelligence in the cause may be inferred with certainty from marks or signs of it in the effect.
The first remark I have to make on this scheme is, that it may be doubted whether the distinction which he draws between contingent and necessary truths is so profound as he would represent it.The test of the latter is that " their contrary is impossible." But is it not true of all the truths of common sense when they are properly expressed, that their contrary or rather contradictory is impossible?
Thus take the {219} case of the intuitive conviction of our own existence.The conviction is not that I must have existed, but that " I do now exist; " and of the contradictory of this, " I do not now exist," the conviction is as impossible as of the contradictory of the metaphysical principle of substance and quality, -- namely, that this quality does not imply a substance.
Looking to the account as a whole, including the division and arrangement, it seems to me sufficiently crude.
Some of the principles enumerated under the head of contingent truths have no claim to be regarded as original laws of reason; such as the signification of sounds of the voice, and gestures of the body, the belief in human testimony, and the uniformity of nature.These seem rather to be the result of a gathered experience, to which we may be impelled by natural inclination; and in all such cases the natural principle, which in the case of the uniformity of nature is the principle of cause and effect, should have been enunciated, and not the experiential rule.If these laws were principles of reason, there could be no exceptions to them: but every one knows that the sounds of the voice, and the expression of the countenance, and human testimony, may deceive; and it is conceivable that the present order of things may be changed "as a vesture." I cannot see how, under the head of principles relating to necessary truth, he should include convictions relating to so artificial a product as language.It may be argued, I think, that the principle of design is a modification of the principle of causality; that is, discovering design as an effect, we argue an intelligent cause.By his loose statements he exposed himself to the criticism of Priestley, who {220}
objects to our regard for testimony as being a principle of common sense." It is a long time before a child hears any thing but truth, and therefore it can expect nothing else.
The contrary would be absolutely miraculous." But while Reid may be justly charged with a defect of critical analysis, and of categorical expression, he has enunciated in a plain manner an immense body of important truth which can be shown to have the sanction of intuitive reason.
The question has been much discussed, Where did Reid get the phrase common sense? I believe it is not difficult to settle that question.The phrase was introduced formally into philosophy by Shaftesbury, who, however, shows that it was in use before.Reid has been charged with borrowing it without acknowledgment from Buffier, who certainly employs it in much the same sense as Reid. But it might be argued with greater show of reason, but yet with no sufficient reason, that Buffier, who published his " First Truths " in 1717, took it from Shaftesbury or those who were familiar with the writings of Shaftesbury, which became known on the Continent at an early date.It is certain that by the time of Reid the phrase was in constant use. Even Berkeley says that " since his revolt from metaphysical notions to the plain dictates of nature and common {221}
sense he found his understanding strangely enlightened."(Preface to " Dialogues.") In the previous age philosophy had taken up a number of extreme positions, and those who were not ready to adopt them, and yet were not prepared to refute them by logic, were everywhere appealing to common sense.
Notwithstanding the able and learned defence of the phrase by Hamilton, I look upon it as an unfortunate one.
The word sense seems to associate the faculty with the bodily organism, with which certainly it has no connection.
Still the term was so frequently used by Locke, Shaftesbury, and Hutcheson, who all talked not only of a bodily but an internal sense, while the two latter called in a moral sense and a sense of beauty, that it might, in accordance with established usage, be employed to indicate that the sense common to all mankind is an original inlet of knowledge,-an aspect often overlooked by those who represent it as an <a priori> form or regulative principle.By employing the word, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson, and Reid meant to intimate that there are other sources of ideas besides the external and internal senses, sensation and reflection.The fundamental objection to the phrase "common sense" is, that it is ambiguous.In saying so, I do not refer to the meaning attached to it by Aristotle, who denoted by
