Immanuel Fichte, the son of the great philosopher, maintains similar theories in his book on Ethics, System der Ethik (2 B., 2Th., ?93). The right of possession, according to him, is a direct right, inalienable and antecedent to all law. Property ispossession conformable to law, and guaranteed by public power. It is instituted for the general good, from whence it followsthat the proprietor not only may not misuse his property, but is even juridically bound to use it well. "We come," says Fichte,"to a social organization of property. It will lose its exclusively private character to become a true, public institution. It willnot be enough to guarantee to every one his, property legally acquired; we must enable him to obtain the property whichought to accrue tohim in exchange for his legitimate labour." "Labour is a duty towards oneself and towards others: he whodoes not work, injures another, and consequently deserves punishment" (?97). Every one ought to be possessed ofproperty, says Hegel in his Rechtsphilosophie ?49; " Jeder muss Eigenthum haben ." Schiller has rendered the same idea intwo lines, which contain the whole philosophy of history:--Etwas muss er sein eigen nennen, Oder der Mensch wird mordin und brennen.
"Man must have something that he may call his own, or he will burn and slay."The same theory is expounded even more completely in the excellent manual on natural law ( Naturrecht ) by M. H. Ahrens.
According to this eminent jurist, "law consists in the group of conditions necessary for the physical and spiritualdevelopment of man, so far as these conditions are dependent on human will. Property is the realization of the sum of themeans and conditions necessary for the development, physical or spiritual, of each individual, in the quality and quantityconformable to his rational wants. The right of property includes the conditions and means for the acquisition , retaining ,and employment of property, and comprises at the same time the judicial actions given to the proper person, for therecovery, the establishment, or the exercise of ownership.""For every man property is a condition of his existence and development. It is based on the actual nature of man, and shouldtherefore be regarded as an original, absolute right which is not the result of any outward act, such as occupation, labour orcontract. The right springing directly from human nature, the title of being a man is sufficient to confer a right of property."The proof of the truth of this doctrine is that the very persons, who do not recognise it or who would condemn it, haveadmitted principles which necessarily lead to it.
"Property," says Portalis, "is a natural right; the principle of the right is in ourselves." But if it is a natural right,a right, thatis, resulting from the very nature of man, it follows that we can deprive no man of it. The reason of the existence of propertyindicated by Portalis, implies property for all. In order to support himself, he says, man should be able to appropriate aportion of the soil to cultivate by his labour. Precisely so: but by man we must understand all men; for all, in fact, are unableto exist except by appropriation of some kind. Hence it follows from the system of Portalis, that the right of appropriation isgeneral, and that no one ought to be deprived of it.
"Property," says Dalloz ( Répert. gén. V. Propriété ), "is not an innate right, but it springs from an innate right. This innateright, which contains property in the germ, is liberty; and from liberty property flows of necessity." If Dalloz is right, itfollows that every man entitled to ******* is also entitled to property.
"Every member of the human race," says M. Renonard, "requires to be escorted by and invested with properties, which shalladhere to him and form his proprietary domain." Very well; but then social institutions must be so regulated, that by theexercise of his right of appropriation every one may attain to the escort and investiture of property.
The instinctive respect for this natural right to property residing in every man serves as a basis for the right to assistance,which is simply its equivalent, and which all legislatures, and notably that of England, have sanctioned. If the primordial rightof appropriation be denied, we must allow that Malthus was right: the man who has no property, has not the slightest rightto turn it to account: "at the banquet of nature no place is reserved for him; he is really an intruder on the earth. Nature bidshim take himself off, and she will not be slow to put this order into execution herself." Nothing can be more true. If mancannot claim the "domain of appropriation," which M. Renouard talks of, he no longer has any right to assistance.
We occupy an island, on `which we live by the fruits of our labour; a shipwrecked sailor is cast on to it: what is his right?
May he invoke the universal opinion of jurists, and say: You have occupied the soil in virtue of your title as human beings,because property is the condition of liberty, and of cultivation a necessity of existence, a natural right: but I too am a man, Itoo have a natural right to cultivate the soil. I may therefore, on the same title as you, occupy a corner of this land tosupport myself by my labour.
If the justice of this claim is denied, there is no course but to throw the new comer back into the waves, or, as Malthus says,to leave to nature the task of ridding the earth, on which there is no spot to shelter him, of his presence.
